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The Treasury bill rate is generally viewed as the
representative money market rate. For this reason
bill rates are almost always used in studies of the
determinants of short-term interest rate levels and
spreads,
1 and bill rates are typically used as the index
rate for variable-rate financial contracts.
2 Despite
this central role accorded Treasury bill rates, they
frequently diverge greatly from other high-grade
money market yields of comparable maturity. Fur-
thermore, this differential is subject to abrupt change.
These aspects of the spread are illustrated in Chart 1,
which uses the three-month prime negotiable CD
rate (RCD) as the private money market rate.
3
An earlier paper by Cook [7] provided an explana-
tion for the spread in the period prior to 1978.
According to this explanation, prior to 1978 most
individual investors were unable to invest in private
money market securities because of the high mini-
mum denomination of those securities. Hence, their
demand for T-bills was related to the spread between
Treasury bill rates and regulated ceiling rates on
small time deposits rather than to the spread between
* Timothy Q. Cook is Vice President, Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond, and Thomas A. Lawler is Senior
Financial Economist, Federal National Mortgage Associ-
ation.
1 In particular, the spread between private money rates
and bill rates is used as a measure of the default-risk
premium on private securities [20]; the bill rate is gen-
erally used to test various hypotheses about the effect of
such economic variables as the rate of inflation or the
money supply on the general level of short-term interest
rates [9, 18]; and bill rates are always used to test
hypotheses about the determinants of money market
yield curves [11, 13].
2 For example, the Treasury bill rate is often used as the
determinant of the yield on adjustable-rate mortgages.
Also, many banks and nonfinancial corporations have
recently issued floating-rate notes with rates tied to
Treasury bill rates.
3 The CD rate is used in this article as a representative
private money market rate. Commercial paper rates
behave similarly to CD rates and statements in this paper
regarding the spread between the CD and bill rate apply
equally well to the spread between the commercial paper
and bill rates.
bill rates and private money rates. When interest
rates rose above deposit rate ceilings at the depository
institutions, the resulting “disintermediation” and
massive purchases of bills by individuals caused bill
rates to fall relative to private money rates.
4
An empirical implication of this explanation was
that the spread between private money rates and bill
rates increased in periods of disintermediation when
bill rates rose relative to the ceiling rates on small
time deposits. The evidence from the earlier study
provided strong support for this implication. Because
ceiling rates on time deposits were fairly inflexible
prior to 1978, this explanation also implied a positive
relationship between the level of rates and the spread.
As shown in Chart 1, this was clearly true in the
pre-1978 period.
Institutional and regulatory developments in 1978
eliminated the underpinnings of this explanation by
providing individuals with ways to earn money
market rates without investing in Treasury bills.
Most importantly, that year saw the beginning of the
rise in popularity of money market mutual funds.
(Money market fund shares grew from $3.3 billion
at the end of 1977 to $9.5 billion at the end of 1978 to
$42.9 billion at the end of 1979.) Also, in June of
1978 depository institutions were first allowed to
offer money market certificates in denominations as
low as $10,000 with an interest rate tied to the 6-
month T-bill rate.
Chart 1 shows that since 1978 the spread has not
approached the levels reached in 1974. Nevertheless,
the spread has been very large at times and it has
4 This explanation of the spread in periods of disinter-
mediation raises an obvious question: Why didn’t other
investors sell their bills and buy private money market
securities, thereby offsetting the impact of individual
purchases on the spread? In fact, other investors in
Treasury bills did react to the rise in the spread in
periods of disintermediation by decreasing their holdings
of bills, but this reaction was insufficient to eliminate the
large movements in the spread caused by sharp increases
in purchases of bills by individuals. This question is
discussed in detail in [7].
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been even more volatile than in the earlier period. A
number of times it has exceeded 200 basis points and
then fallen sharply, sometimes within a couple of
months, to well below 100 basis points. Also, the
spread in the post-1978 period has continued to show
a tendency to move with the level of interest rates,
although a given level of interest rates has generally
been associated with a smaller spread than in the
earlier period.
This article examines the behavior of the spread
in the post-1978 period using models that assume,
contrary to the situation in the earlier period, that
all investors can freely choose between Treasury
bills and private money market securities. The
major conclusion is that movement in the spread
can be fairly well explained in this period under this
assumption by default risk, taxes, and the relative
supply of Treasury bills. Section I presents three
models of the spread and discusses institutional infor-
mation relevant to each. Section II looks briefly at
the behavior of two types of investors in the bill
market. Section III reports regression results for
the three models. Section IV discusses the effect on
the spread of the introduction of money market
deposit accounts in late 1982.
I.
MODELS OF THE SPREAD IN THE POST-1978 PERIOD
This section discusses three models of the spread
between the rate on private money market securities
(RMM) and the rate on Treasury bills (RTB). All
three models assume that investors can choose freely
between investing in private money market securities
or bills. The first model focuses on default risk, while
the second looks at a combination of default risk and
taxes. Both models assume that all investors react
the same to any given RMM-RTB spread. The
third model drops this assumption.
4 ECONOMIC REVIEW, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1983The focus throughout is on the demand for Trea-
sury bills as a function of the RMM-RTB spread.
It is assumed that the relative supply of Treasury
bills is not sensitive to the spread, i.e., that the ratio
of bills to total money market securities supplied
is completely inelastic with respect to the spread.
Gaps between U. S. government expenditures and
receipts are the primary determinant of the amount
of T-bills issued; while the Treasury at times alters
the average maturity of U. S. Treasury debt, there is
no evidence that such decisions are influenced by the
RMM-RTB spread. Furthermore, it is reasonable to
assume that the aggregate supply of private money
market securities is not varied in reaction to move-
ments in the RMM-RTB spread. (This latter as-
sumption is discussed below.)
Default-Risk Model
The simplest view of the RMM-RTB spread in the
post-1978 period is that it results solely from default
risk on private money market securities. Treasury
bills are backed by the full faith and credit of the
U. S. government and are generally considered de-
fault free. In contrast, private money market securi-
ties such as CDs or commercial paper are backed by
the promise of private corporations and, consequently,
there is a general perception that default is possible
on these securities.
Since investors care about expected, not promised,
yields, they demand a higher promised yield on pri-
vate money securities than on bills in order to offset
the perceived risk of default and to equalize expected
returns. Investors may also demand an additional
premium for holding a riskier asset. The extra yield
required by investors because of these factors is called
the default-risk premium. According to the default-
risk model, the RMM-RTB spread is a direct mea-
sure of this default-risk premium (DRP) on. private
money market securities :
(1) RMM - RTB = DRP.
Hence, according to this model, movements in the
spread simply reflect movements in DRP. Figure 1
illustrates the simple default-risk model of the spread.
For any value of the default-risk premium the de-
mand curve for T-bills is infinitely elastic with respect
to the RMM-RTB spread. This implies that shifts
in the relative supply of bills have no effect on the
spread.
The default-risk premium on private money securi-
ties is dependent on the attitudes of investors, which
are not directly measurable. However, the simple
default-risk model of the RMM-RTB spread can
be evaluated by comparing it to yield spreads that are
solely a function of default risk: if the default-risk
model is correct, the RMM-RTB spread should be-
have similarly to these spreads.
5 One money market
default-risk spread that has been available since the
beginning of 1974 is the spread between the one-
month medium-grade and prime-grade commercial
paper rates (CPS). Chart 2 compares this spread to
the RMM-RTB spread.
6 The chart shows that the
RMM-RTB spread does frequently move with the
commercial paper rate spread. There are periods,
however, such as mid-1980 through the end of 1981,
when the RMM-RTB spread behaves very differ-
ently than the commercial paper rate spread.
Tax and Risk Model
The preceding discussion assumes that interest
income earned on Treasury bills and private money
market securities is taxed equally, which is true at
the federal level. At the state and local level, how-
ever, interest income on T-bills is exempt from in-
come taxes while interest income on private money
market securities is not. Individual income tax rates
5 These spreads typically rise in periods of recession and
fall in periods of economic expansion. See Van Horne
[21]
6 The commercial paper rate spread is only available
beginning in 1974 and there are no other yield series
available to construct short-term default-risk spreads.
Hence the chart starts in 1974.
Figure 1
DEFAULT-RISK MODEL
Aggregate Demand for Treasury Bills
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 5Chart 2
THE SPREAD BETWEEN THE CD AND T-BILL RATES
COMPARED TO CPS
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983
applied to interest income range across states from includes investors that pay a “franchise” or “excise”
as low as zero to as high as 17 percent. These rates tax that in fact requires them to pay state taxes on
are shown in Table I as of October 1979.
7 In some interest earned on T-bills.
8 Commercial banks in 28
cases there are also local income tax rates; for ex- states, including most of the heavily populated states,
ample, in New York City the highest marginal local pay such a tax. And in 17 states there is a franchise
income tax rate exceeds 4 percent. tax on nonfinancial corporate income.
9
Despite the exemption of T-bill interest income
from state and local taxation, there are three cate-
gories of investors who do not pay a higher tax rate
on interest income of private money market securi-
ties than bills. The first includes investors who are
not subject to state and local taxes, namely state and
local governments and foreign investors. The second
The third type of investor taxed equally on interest
income of T-bills and private money securities is
money market fund (MMF) shareholders. All
interest earned through investment in money market
funds, including T-bill interest income, is subject to
state and local income taxes. Consequently, an in-
vestor owning shares in a money market fund that
holds T-bills must pay all applicable state and local
taxes on the interest income, even though the investor 7 The tax rates shown are for the highest marginal tax
rates. However, in almost all states the maximum tax
rate-or one very close to it-is reached at a relatively
low income. (The only exceptions are Alaska, Delaware,
Louisiana, New Mexico, and West Virginia.) Hence,
one can make the assumption that, in general, interest
income on private money market investments in a given
state is taxed at the highest marginal tax rate in that
state.
8 These taxes function exactly like an income tax and
were instituted expressly to get around the prohibition
of state and local taxes on interest income of federal
securities. See [4] and [15].
9 These states are listed in [6, p. 652].
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1. The tax rates shown are maximum rates. (See footnote 7.)
2. States marked with asterik (*) have tax rates specified
as a percent of Federal income fax liability. The percent
is 18 percent for Nebraska, 19 percent for Rhode island,
and 23 percent for Vermont.
Source: Reproduced with permission from 1979 Edition, State
Tax Handbook, published and copyrighted by Commerce
Clearing House, Inc., 4025 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL
60646, pp. 660-71.
would not have to pay state and local taxes on that
income if he purchased the T-bills directly.
The implications of the wide range of relative tax
rates on T-bill versus private interest income for the
determination of RMM-RTB spread will be con-
sidered below. For the present consider the case in
which all investors are subject to the same marginal
state and local tax rate of t on private interest
income; then the relationship between RMM and
RTB would be
(2) RMM(1-t) = RTB or
(2a) RMM - RTB = tRMM or
(2b) RMM/RTB = 1/(1-t).
Equation (2a) states that the RMM-RTB spread
is positively related to the level of interest rates; the
after-tax yields will remain equal only if the before-
tax yield spread rises or falls in proportion to changes
in the level of interest rates. Equation (2b) indicates
that the ratio of RMM to RTB is constant over time
when taxes are the only factor affecting the spread
and marginal income tax rates are the same for all
investors.
10
Chart 1 demonstrates that the RMM-RTB spread
does tend to move with the level of interest rates.
Chart 3, which plots the ratio of the three-month
CD rate to the three-month T-bill rate, illustrates
that this’ ratio is not constant. Although variability of
the RMM/RTB ratio is inconsistent with the simple
tax model, the RMM/RTB ratio in the post-1978
period has been much less variable than the RMM-
RTB spread. Moreover, the ratio, unlike the spread,
is not strongly correlated to the level of rates over
this period.
11
Of course, this simple tax model is deficient in that
it ignores the effect of the default-risk premium on
the spread. The tax and default-risk models can be
joined by combining equations (1) and (2) :
(3) RMM(1-t) = RTB + DRP or
(3a) RMM - RTB = tRMM + DRP or
(3b) RMM/RTB = 1/(1-t) +
DRP/RTB (l-t).
In this tax and risk model, the RMM-RTB spread is
positively associated with the level of interest rates 
as in the simple tax model. However, in equation
10 Suppose an investor is subject to a marginal federal
income tax rate of t f and a marginal state income tax
rate of t S. State taxes paid can be deducted from federal
income taxes. Hence, if the investor pays state income
tax on private money market securities but not on Trea-
sury bills, then the before-tax yields on Treasury bills
and private money market securities that result in equal
after-tax yields will be:
RMM(1 - t f - t S  + t ft S) = RTB(1 - t f)
which can be reduced to:
RMM(1 - t S) = RTB,
which is the formula in the text.
11 For the period from January 1979 through June 1983
the correlation coefficient between the RMM-RTB spread
and the level of the Treasury bill rate is .520. However,
the correlation coefficient between the ratio and the level
of the bill rate is only .068. (Note in Chart 3 that in the
pre-1978 period the RMM/RTB ratio is as volatile as
the spread and that it is also highly correlated with the
level of rates. Over the 1974-77 period the correlation
coefficient between the spread and the level of the bill
rate is .799 while the correlation coefficient between the
ratio and the level of the bill rate is .758.)
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(3b) the RMM/RTB ratio is not constant but
changes with the DRP/RTB ratio.
Figure 2 illustrates the aggregate demand curve
Figure 2
for T-bills implied by the combination of the default-
risk and tax models. As the figure shows, at any
given level of interest rates and default-risk premium,
the demand for T-bills is infinitely elastic with re-
spect to the RMM-RTB spread. If RMM rises and
the default-risk premium remains unchanged, then
the whole demand curve simply shifts upward by an
amount equal to the product of the tax rate times
RMM. Moreover, it can be seen from Figure 2 that
changes in the relative supply of T-bills, if unaccom-
panied by changes in the level of interest rates or
default-risk premium, have no effect on the RMM-
RTB spread.
Chart 4 compares the RMM/RTB ratio to the
ratio of the commercial paper spread and RTB in the
1979-83 period. The two series move fairly closely
together over the whole 1979-83 period, suggesting Aggregate Demand for Treasury Bilk
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that the risk and tax model is superior to either the
default-risk model or the tax model alone.
12
Heterogeneous Investor Model
The tax and risk model assumes that all investors
bear the same relative tax rates on private money
securities and T-bills. As discussed above, however,
there are substantial differences across investors with
respect to the relative taxation of private versus T-bill
interest income; that is, investors differ with respect
to the tax rates they face.
A second source of investor heterogeneity involves
various implicit returns that some investors receive
12 
In contrast, it is evident from Chart 4 that in the
1974-77 period the tax and risk model does a poor job of
explaining the spread.
from holding T-bills-i.e., returns not measured by
the stated T-bill yield. These implicit returns arise
from various laws and regulations, many of which
have changed over time. Banks, in particular, receive
various implicit returns from holding Treasury bills.
For example, banks (and other depository institu-
tions) can use Treasury bills at full face value to
satisfy pledging requirements against state and local
and federal deposits. Also, Treasury bills improve
the ratio of equity to risk assets, a measure bank
regulators use to judge a bank’s capital adequacy.
Moreover, prior to the Monetary Control Act of
1980, nonmember banks in over half of the states had
reserve requirements that could be satisfied at least
partially-and in some cases totally-by holding un-
pledged Treasury bills. Finally, funds acquired by a
bank that enters into a repurchase agreement are free
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 9 of reserve requirements if the securities involved are
obligations of the U. S. or federal agencies.
13
Treasury bills also provide implicit returns by
virtue of their preferred position in certain financial
markets. They are accepted without question as
collateral for margin purchases or short sales of
securities. And they can be used to satisfy the initial
margin requirements for many types of financial
futures contracts, whereas private money market
securities cannot be used for this purpose.
With different tax rates and implicit returns, in-
vestors will react differently to a particular RMM-
RTB spread. For example, even at a large RMM-
RTB spread and a very small default-risk premium,
the demand for T-bills will be positive because in-
vestors with a high marginal state and local tax rate
on private interest income and a zero-tax rate on
T-bill interest income will find it advantageous to
buy T-bills instead of CDs or commercial paper. As
the spread falls, more and more investors with
smaller differentials between the tax rates on interest
income of private securities and T-bills will find it
advantageous to buy T-bills.
14 A similar conclusion
holds for differential implicit returns. If these vary
across investors, then a decline in the spread will
induce investors receiving lower implicit returns to
buy bills.
13 
These implicit returns are discussed in more detail in
[7]. Pledging requirements are described in [1, 10, 14],
state reserve requirements prior to the Monetary Control
Act in [12], regulations on repurchase agreements in
[17], and bank capital adequacy measures in [19].
14 
An assumption in this discussion is that the possible
investment in Treasury bills by a particular investor is
limited. The argument might be made that there are
risk-free arbitrage opportunities that would provide in-
centives for investors to borrow funds in the bill (CD)
market and lend them in the CD (bill) market. These
opportunities generally are not present. because only the
Treasury can issue T-bills and only the direct holder of
T-bills receives the state and local tax exemption. For
example, it might be argued that at large values of the
spread, there is an opportunity for investors with equal
tax rates on bill and private interest income to borrow
bills at a rate slightly above the bill rate, sell them and
invest the proceeds in private securities. However, in-
vestors that loan bills under this arrangement lose the
tax exemption on T-bill interest income; hence, they
need to be paid at least RTB/(1-t) to be induced to
loan their bills. This eliminates the arbitrage opportunity
for the equal-tax rate investor.
Conversely, suppose the spread is zero; then there
appears to exist arbitrage opportunities for investors with
unequal tax rates on private and T-bill interest income.
These investors could issue private securities (deducting
the interest paid from their-taxable income) and invest
the funds in bills. However, as discussed in the text,
investors with the highest tax rate on private versus bill
interest income are individuals. They clearly are not
able to, and do not, engage in this kind of activity. If
individual investors pool their funds to buy bills, then
they are in effect forming a financial intermediary to buy
bills indirectly and they lose the tax exemption on T-bill
Consequently, with differing tax rates and implicit
returns, the aggregate demand for T-bills-given
some constant default-risk premium-decreases only
gradually as the RMM-RTB spread rises. When the
RMM-RTB spread is high relative to the default-risk
premium, the aggregate demand for T-bills will be
relatively low; as the RMM-RTB spread declines,
the aggregate demand for T-bills will increase. When
the spread falls to the level of the default-risk prem-
ium, the demand will be completely elastic as in the
simple default-risk model.
Figure 3 illustrates the heterogeneous investor
model. The figure shows that an increase in the level
of interest rates can affect the RMM-RTB spread
because of the tax effect. However, the effect of a
rise in the level of rates on the spread depends on the
relative supply of T-bills; the greater the relative
supply of bills, the smaller the effect on the spread
of a given increase in the level of rates.
Moreover, changes in the supply of T-bills can
have a direct effect on the RMM-RTB spread. For
instance, if the relative supply of T-bills falls, the
RMM-RTB spread might rise, as a greater propor-
interest. This is precisely the situation of money market
funds (see Section II of this article). However, in
periods of very low values of the spread, there does
appear to be arbitrage opportunities for large investors
(i.e., banks) in states with high income tax rates who are-
not ‘subject’ to excise or franchise taxes on T-bill interest
income. In periods of small spreads, one might expect to
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INVESTMENT IN T-BILLS BY INDIVIDUALS
AND MMFS
Additional evidence on the effect of differential
taxation (of interest income on bills versus private
securities) on the spread in the 1979-83 period is
contained in monthly data on T-bill investment by
individuals and MMFs. As discussed earlier, indi-
viduals as a group have the largest differential be-
tween the tax rates paid on private versus T-bill
interest income. At the other extreme are the share-
holders of MMFs who are taxed equally on the
interest of T-bills and private instruments.
Chart 6 compares the bill holdings of MMFs to the
RMM-RTB spread. MMF investment in bills is
negatively and strongly correlated to the spread.
18
Hence, even though MMFs primarily buy bills in-
directly for individual investors, their response to
changes in the spread differs markedly from that of
individual investors.
No data is available on individual investment in
T-bills. However, the percentage of bills awarded to
noncompetitive bidders
15 at weekly Treasury bill
auctions is a widely used barometer of individual
investment activity in the bill market.
16 Chart 5
The pattern of investment in T-bills by individuals
and MMFs can be explained by the different tax
rates applicable to the two groups and, in addition,
strongly suggests that taxes played a role in the be-
havior of the spread in the post-1978 period. The
reasoning is as follows. As interest rates rise, at a
given level of the before-tax RMM-RTB yield’
spread, the after-tax yield spread falls for investors
(individuals) taxed on private interest but not on
T-bill interest, inducing them to increase their bill
15 
Investors who purchase $1,000,000 or less of bills at the
weekly auction can make a “noncompetitive bid,” where-
by the investor agrees to pay the average price of ac-





Based on Treasury Department data for 1986, 60 per-
cent or more of the dollar volume of noncompetitive bids
at the weekly Treasury bill auctions during that year
(excluding noncompetitive bids made by Government
accounts or the Federal Reserve) were made in the New
York Federal Reserve District, which has by far the
highest district-wide average state income tax rate.
18 
The correlation coefficient between the percent of
MMF assets invested in bills and the spread over the
period in Chart 6 is --.438. In contrast, the correlation




WEEKLY AUCTION COMPARED TO
LEVEL OF RATES
Chart 6
TREASURY BILLS AS A PERCENT
OF TOTAL MMF ASSETS COMPARED TO
RCD-RTB SPREAD
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19 This puts downward pressure on the bill
rate and increases the before-tax RMM-RTB yield
spread. At the same time, the increase in the before-
tax yield spread causes a comparable increase in the
after-tax yield spread for investors (MMFs) who
pay equal tax rates on T-bill and private interest
income. This rise in the after-tax yield spread in-
duces them to decrease  their purchase of bills. Hence,
a rise in the level of interest rates is followed (1) by
an increase in the holdings of bills by investors with
unequal tax rates on T-bill and private interest in-
come, (2) by a rise in the RMM-RTB spread, and
(3) by a decrease in the holdings of bills by investors
with equal tax rates on the two types of interest
income.
19 
It is relevant to this argument that following the
growth of MMFs in 1978 and the introduction of MMCs
in that year, the effect of taxes on the after-tax yields of
these investments relative to the yields earned by direct
investment in bills was well publicized. For instance! in
March 1979 the Wall Street Journal published an article
entitled “Where State and Local Taxes Hurt, Investors
Can Earn More in Direct Purchases of Bills” [22]. See
also [3, 5].
III.
ESTIMATES OF THE SPREAD MODELS
Risk and Tax Models
Regression estimates of the alternative models of
the spread are presented in Table II.
20 The spread
between the medium-grade and prime-grade commer-
cial paper rates (CPS) is used as a proxy for the
default-risk premium on CDs, the assumption being
that the true default-risk premium is linearly related
to this spread.
The coefficient of CPS in the risk equation regres-
20 
The reported regressions follow the conventional pro-
cedure of using the risk-free rate (the T-bill rate) as the
right-hand side (independent) variable. Actually, the tax
and risk model is an equilibrium relationship. Because of
this, there is no a priori reason to use the Treasury bill
as opposed to the CD rate as the right-hand side variable
in the regression equations. The regressions were also
estimated with the CD rate as the right-hand side vari-
able. The estimated coefficient of the interest rate vari-
able in these regressions (reported in [8]) is somewhat





1. The Durbin-Watson statistics in the ordinary least-squares regressions were in the neighborhood of 1.0 to 1.2, indicating the
presence of autocorrelated residuals. Consequently, the equations were re-estimated using the Hildreth-Lu procedure to correct
for first-order serial correlation.
2. Numbers in parentheses under coefficients ore t-statistics. are the values of the
statistics for the comparable ordinary least-squares regressions.
[8], were extremely close to those reported here.)
(The ordinary least-squares regression coefficients, reported in
3. CPS is the spread between the one-month medium-grade and prime-grade commercial paper rates.
RTB is three-month bond-equivalent secondary market Treasury bill rate.
RCD is the three-month bond-equivalent prime negotiable CD rate.
TB is the outstanding stock of Treasury bills less amount held by Federal Reserve.
L is total liquid assets as defined by the Federal Reserve.
4. Treasury bills outstanding are from the Treasury Bulletin and the Monthly Statement of the Public Debt of the’ United States, both
published by the U. S. Treasury Department. All other data are from various publications of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
12 ECONOMIC REVIEW, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1983sion, equation 1 in Table II, has the correct sign and
is highly significant. In the regression equation of
the tax and risk model, equation 3, the coefficients of
both the risk and tax variables have the correct signs
and are highly significant. The overall fit of the esti-
mated tax and risk model is considerably better than
the simple risk model
21 and the value of the auto-
correlation coefficient, p, is considerably lower.
These results support the conclusion that differ-
ential taxation of interest income on T-bills and pri-
vate money securities was an important determinant
of the RMM-RTB spread in the 1979-83 period.
The tax rate implied by the coefficient of RTB in
equation 3 is 8.3 percent,
22 which is well within the
range of state individual tax rates on interest income
given in Table I. Hence, the magnitude of the
interest rate coefficient is consistent with the tax
explanation of the relationship between the level of
rates and the spread in the post-1978 period.
Heterogeneous Investor Model
The implications of the heterogeneous investor
model discussed in Section I were that (1) the
RMM-RTB spread may be negatively related to the
relative supply of T-bills and (2) the effects of the
level of rates and the relative supply of T-bills on
the spread may be interdependent; that is, the effect
of an increase in the level of interest rates on the
spread may depend on the supply of bills outstand-
ing.
23
The supply variable used in the heterogeneous in-
vestor model regressions is the ratio of T-bills out-
standing net of Federal Reserve holdings (TB) to
total liquid assets (L), a proxy for the overall size of
the money market.
24 Two regressions are reported
21 
This statement is especially true for the ordinary least-
squares summary statistics, which provide a more mean-
ingful comparison across regressions since they do not
depend on the value of the autocorrelation coefficient.
22 
The implied tax rate is calculated from equation 2 in
the text as c/(1+c) where c is the coefficient of the
Treasury bill rate.
23 
For previous evidence of supply effects on the spread
see [16].
24 
The specific form of the supply variable used in these
regressions is by necessity somewhat arbitrary. Regres-
sions with alternative forms of the supply variable, re-
ported in [S], did not alter the conclusion that the relative
supply of Treasury bills affected the spread in the post-
1978 period. First, L, the denominator of the relative
supply variable,, was replaced with two narrower mea-
sures: (1) T-bills plus large CDs plus commercial paper
plus bankers acceptances and (2) T-bills plus large CDs.
In both cases the t-statistic of the coefficient of the
supply variable rose. Second, marketable U. S. govern-
ment securities of foreign accounts held in custody at
the Federal Reserve were netted out of the numerator of
the relative supply variable. When this was done, the
t-statistic of the coefficient of the supply variable rose.
in Table II. The first regression simply adds the
relative supply variable to the tax and risk model.
The variable’s coefficient has the correct sign and is
statistically significant.
25 The magnitude of the coeffi-
cient implies that if the relative share of T-bills in
total liquid assets rises by one percentage point, the
RMM-RTB spread falls by 15 basis points. Trea-
sury bills range from approximately 5.6 to 9.3 percent
of total liquid assets over the period covered by the
regressions; hence, the regression results imply that
supply factors explain a relatively small part of the
movement in the spread in that period.
The second regression reported in Table II uses a
specification in which the effects of the interest rate
and supply variables are interdependent :
where e is the base of the natural logarithm. This
specification also implies that the larger the relative
share of bills to liquid assets (TB/L), the smaller
the effect on the spread of further increases in the
share, which should be the case if the aggregate
demand for T-bills flattens out at low levels of RMM-
RTB, as argued earlier. This equation was estimated
by experimenting with different values of d and
choosing the value of d for which the sum of squared
residuals in the ordinary least-squares regression was
lowest. The coefficient of the interest rate/supply
variable is highly significant while the summary sta-
tistics of the regression are only slightly better than
for the regression with the linear supply variable.
The estimate of the tax rate implied by the coeffi-
cient of RTB ranges from 6.3 percent to 10.1 percent
over the estimation period.
26 While this specification
yields results that are very close to the first one, it
makes more sense a priori and for that reason should
25 
A reasonable question regarding this result is whether
the coefficient of TB/L is affected by simultaneous
equations bias, i.e., whether a change in the RMM-RTB
spread induces a response that alters the relative supply
of T-bills outstanding. We do not think this is a serious
problem because the movement in the TB/L ratio is
determined mainly by the movement in Treasury bills
outstanding and the Treasury’s supply of bills is clearly
not responsive to the RMM-RTB spread. Admittedly,
on a priori grounds it is possible that the supply of
private securities by some agents may be marginally
responsive to the spread. (Although see footnote 14 on
this point.) For example, it might be argued that at large
values of the spread, depository institutions that pay
equal tax rates on bill and private interest income would
sell bills and simultaneously run down their CDs out-
standing. However, we are not aware of any evidence
that the RMM-RTB spread is an important determinant
of the aggregate supply of private short-term securities.
26 
This is calculated as c*/1+c* where c* is the coeffi-
cient of RTB in regression (4b) in Table II and is
dependent on TB/L.
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future. Since the bill share variable TB/L should
rise in coming years because of large budget deficits,
this means that a rise in the level of rates should be
associated with a smaller rise in the spread than in
the 1979-83 period.
IV.
THE EFFECT OF MMDAs ON THE SPREAD
In mid-December 1982, all interest rate ceilings on
short-term deposits with minimum denominations of
$2500 at depository institutions were removed. The
“money market deposit accounts” (MMDAs) that
resulted from this deregulation were very popular,
reaching a level of $278 billion by the end of Febru-
ary. A final question addressed here is whether the
introduction of MMDAs decreased the demand for
T-bills and thereby lowered the RMM-RTB spread.
Following the introduction of MMDAs, the
RMM-RTB spread fell to extremely low levels; by
March 1983 it had fallen to an average level of 16
basis points. However, the role played by MMDAs
is difficult to isolate from other influences occurring
at the time. Specifically, MMDAs were introduced
at a time when there were major changes in the
default-risk premium and tax rate variables that
would also cause the spread to fall. Table III shows
that the spread had already fallen sharply before the
introduction of MMDAs in reaction to the decline in
the default-risk premium and the lower level of
interest rates. Also, as was shown in Chart 6, the
demand for bills by individuals-as measured by
noncompetitive bids at the weekly auction-had
fallen sharply prior to the introduction of MMDAs in
reaction to the decline in market interest rates.
Chart 7 shows the weekly data for noncompetitive
bids around the time of the introduction of MMDAs.
Noncompetitive bids dropped substantially the two
weeks following the introduction of MMDAs. This
occurred in a period of stable short-term interest
rates, which indicates that initially MMDAs de-
creased the demand for bills by individuals. By
the first weekly auction in January, however, non-
competitive bids had returned to their pre-MMDA
level. Hence, there is little evidence from the non-
competitive bids data of a lasting effect of MMDAs
on the demand for bills. To test for an effect on the
RMM-RTB spread, a dummy variable was incor-
porated into the spread regression (equation 4a in
Table II). This variable was set equal to 1 for the
Table Ill





















RCD is the three-month bond-equivalent prime CD rate.
RTB is the three-month bond-equivalent Treasury bill rate.
CPS is the spread between the bond-equivalent medium-grade and
prime-grade commercial paper rates.
months beginning in December 1982.
27 The vari-
able’s coefficient was close to zero and not significant,
which reinforces the evidence from the noncompeti-
tive bids data.
27 
The dummy variable was given a value of 0.5 in
December since MMDAs were introduced December 15.
Chart 7
NONCOMPETITIVE BIDS AT
WEEKLY TREASURY BILL AUCTION
COMPARED TO THE CD RATE
(November 1982 - February 1983)
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CONCLUSIONS
The volatile behavior of the RMM-RTB spread
over the post-1978 period can be fairly well explained
by models that assume investors can choose freely
between Treasury bills and private money market se-
curities.
28 Variable default-risk premiums and differ-
ential taxation of interest income on bills and private
securities were found to be the two major deter-
minants of the spread in this period. A model of the
spread that allowed for investors experiencing differ-
ent tax rates and implicit returns was discussed. This
model holds that the relative supply of bills can affect
the spread. Regression results supported this con-
tention, although the effect of the bill supply variable
was small compared to the other two determinants
of the spread.
28 
This raises the question of whether these models can
explain the behavior of the spread in the pre-1978 period.
Unfortunately, a key ‘variable used in this article--the
commercial paper rate spread-is available only since
1974 and the only swing in the RMM-RTB spread in the
74-77 period occurred in 1974. (In contrast there were 5
major swings in the spread in the 1979-83 period.) How-
ever, the models discussed in this paper clearly do a
poor job of explaining what happened to the spread in
1974. This conclusion is based on Charts 2, 3, 4 and
footnotes 11 and 12. Chart 2 shows that the RMM-RTB
spread fell sharply in the latter part of 1974 even though
CPS stayed very high until the end of the 1974-75 reces-
sion. Chart 4 shows that the tax and risk model has the
same problem.
The main implication of the simple tax model is similar
to that of the disintermediation argument: both imply
that the spread is positively related to the level of interest
rates. However, the tax model clearly can not explain
the extremely high levels of the RMM/RTB ratio, shown
in Chart 3, in 1974. (Nor can the tax model explain
values of the ratio persistently above 1.2 in earlier periods
of disintermediation, such as 1969-70 and 1973.) Regres-
sions for the 1974-77 period, reported in [8], reinforce the
comments made here.
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